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Before:  SMITH, CHAGARES, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed June 7, 2011) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Carnegie Mellon University (“CMU”) appeals the District Court‟s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Christian Bouriez and his corporate alter-ego Montanelle 
Beheer B.V. (collectively, “Bouriez”) with respect to Bouriez‟s negligent 
2 
 
misrepresentation claim.  Bouriez conditionally cross appeals the District Court‟s 
dismissal of his fraudulent misrepresentation claim.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
vacate and remand.   
I. 
We write for the parties‟ benefit and recite only the facts essential to our 
disposition.  We also assume the parties‟ familiarity with the two previous opinions 
issued by this Court in this matter.  See Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 585 F.3d 765 
(3d Cir. 2009) (“Bouriez II”); Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 359 F.3d 292 (3d Cir. 
2004) (“Bouriez I”). 
CMU is a non-profit research university located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.  In 
1997, an unincorporated nonacademic division of CMU was in the process of developing 
a “microwave-enhanced catalytic cracking project” (the “microwave technology”).  
Bouriez II, 585 F.3d at 767.  Later that year, CMU entered into a contractual relationship 
(the “sponsorship agreement”) with third parties Governors Technologies Corporation 
and Governors Refining Technologies, LLC (collectively, “Governors”).  Pursuant to the 
terms of the sponsorship agreement, Governors agreed to fund the commercialization of 
the microwave technology in exchange for the licensing rights.   
Bouriez lives in London, England.  In 1999, CMU approached Bouriez in order to 
solicit his investment in the microwave technology.  After meeting with representatives 
of both CMU and Governors, Bouriez agreed to invest $5 million in Governors.  Bouriez 
never entered into a contractual relationship with CMU.   
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Bouriez subsequently lost his investment, and both Bouriez and Governors 
claimed that CMU had induced their investments by making false representations about 
the microwave technology.  In December 2002, Bouriez initiated this action against 
CMU, asserting claims for fraudulent misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation.
1
  
Bouriez did not file a complaint against Governors.  In January 2003, CMU filed a 
demand for arbitration against both Bouriez and Governors, invoking an arbitration 
provision of the sponsorship agreement.  CMU also filed a motion before the District 
Court to compel Bouriez to join that arbitration, a motion that Bouriez opposed.  The 
District Court granted the motion, but this Court reversed in Bouriez I due to the lack of a 
contractual relationship between CMU and Bouriez.  359 F.3d 292.  As a result, only 
CMU and Governors proceeded to arbitration, while the dispute between CMU and 
Bouriez remained before the District Court. 
On August 25, 2006, the arbitrator issued a final award against CMU and in favor 
of Governors (the “Arbitration Award”).  Appendix (“App.”) 109-148.  The Arbitration 
Award found, inter alia, that CMU had made negligent misrepresentations regarding the 
feasibility of the microwave technology to Governors; that the contract between the two 
parties should be rescinded; and that CMU should return Governors‟ investment, with 
interest and costs, and that all rights, title, and interest in the microwave technology 
should revert to CMU.  In deciding against CMU on the claim for negligent 
misrepresentation, the Arbitration Award determined that CMU owed Governors “a duty 
                                              
1
  Bouriez also asserted a claim for unjust enrichment, which he subsequently withdrew.   
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of full disclosure” in light of the “special” or “confidential” relationship between the two 
parties.  App. 144-47.  The Arbitration Award also held that in light of this relationship, 
Governors “justifiably relied” on CMU‟s misrepresentations.  App. 147.  The Arbitration 
Award did not make any findings in regard to CMU‟s relationship with Bouriez.  
Ultimately, CMU paid Governors approximately $10 million to satisfy the Arbitration 
Award.   
Bouriez and CMU subsequently filed cross motions for summary judgment before 
the District Court regarding the effect of the Arbitration Award.  Bouriez argued that the 
Arbitration Award conclusively established CMU‟s liability on his claims pursuant to the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel, while CMU posited that its satisfaction of the Arbitration 
Award precluded Bouriez from establishing the requisite proximate causation elements of 
his fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation claims.  On August 30, 2007, the District 
Court agreed with CMU and granted summary judgment in CMU‟s favor.  App. 85-108.  
In Bouriez II, this Court vacated and remanded that decision.  585 F.3d 765.  In so doing, 
we explicitly noted that “[b]ecause the collateral estoppel issue does not affect the 
outcome of this appeal, we express no opinion with regard to that dispute.”  Bouriez II, 
585 F.3d at 766 n.1. 
On February 12, 2010, the District Court issued a Memorandum Opinion, holding 
that the Arbitration Award – which pertained only to the dispute between CMU and 
Governors – had a “preclusive effect” on the dispute between CMU and Bouriez.  App. 
6-13.  Bouriez subsequently filed a renewed motion for summary judgment on his 
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negligent misrepresentation claim.  CMU opposed this motion and filed its own motions 
for summary judgment, including one for summary judgment on Bouriez‟s negligent 
misrepresentation claim based upon the applicability of Pennsylvania‟s economic loss 
doctrine.  On April 6, 2010, the District Court issued a Memorandum Opinion, granting 
Bouriez‟s motion and denying CMU‟s motions.  App. 21-30.  Specifically, the District 
Court held that “[a]s is implicit in the Court‟s ruling on the preclusive effect of the 
Arbitration Award [in the February 12, 2010 Memorandum Opinion], [Bouriez is] correct 
that said Award establishes [his] claim of negligent misrepresentation against CMU 
herein.”  App. 22.  The District Court also determined that because Bouriez was “not 
bound by contract . . . [Bouriez‟s] negligent misrepresentation claim is not precluded by 
the economic loss doctrine.”  App. 26 (citation omitted).   
Although neither Bouriez nor CMU previously moved for summary judgment as 
to Bouriez‟s claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, the District Court entered final 
judgment in favor of Bouriez following its April 6, 2010 Memorandum Opinion and 
ordered that the case be marked as closed.  The parties thereafter filed a joint motion 
requesting that the District Court clarify its holding in regard to Bouriez‟s fraudulent 
misrepresentation claim.  On April 26, 2010, the District Court entered a Revised Order 
and Judgment dismissing the claim for fraudulent misrepresentation “[b]ased on . . . [the] 
ruling that the Arbitration Award has preclusive effect on critical issues in this case . . . 
[and] the Arbitrator‟s finding that Governors could not sustain its burden of proving 
fraudulent misrepresentation.”  App. 19.  This timely appeal followed.   
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II. 
This is a diversity action governed by Pennsylvania law.  Bouriez II, 585 F.3d at 
770.  The District Court had jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(a)(2) and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District 
Court‟s grant of summary judgment is plenary, and we apply the same legal standard as 
the District Court.  Vitalo v. Cabot Corp., 399 F.3d 536, 542 (3d Cir. 2005).   
III. 
CMU appeals the District Court‟s entry of summary judgment in favor of Bouriez 
with respect to Bouriez‟s negligent misrepresentation claim.  Bouriez conditionally cross 
appeals the dismissal of his fraudulent misrepresentation claim.  We will discuss each of 
Bouriez‟s claims in turn.  
A.  
In its Memorandum Opinion dated February 12, 2010, the District Court held that 
the Arbitration Award had a “preclusive effect” on the dispute between CMU and 
Bouriez.
2
  The District Court‟s subsequent grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Bouriez on his negligent misrepresentation claim in the April 6, 2010 Memorandum 
Opinion relied wholly on this finding.  As noted above, the District Court held that “[a]s 
                                              
2
  There is no merit to Bouriez‟s claim that “CMU does not challenge this decision and, 
therefore, is bound by the Arbitration Award.”  Bouriez Br. at 23.  CMU appeals from the 
District Court‟s April 26, 2010 Revised Order and Judgment, App. 16-17, which 
explicitly relies on the February 12, 2010 Memorandum Opinion to grant Bouriez 
summary judgment on his claim for negligent misrepresentation, App. 19-20.  CMU also 
consistently argues on appeal that “the District Court stretched precepts of collateral 
estoppel and judicial efficiency beyond their breaking point.”  CMU Br. at 22.   
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is implicit in the Court‟s ruling on the preclusive effect of the Arbitration Award [in the 
February 12, 2010 Memorandum Opinion], [Bouriez is] correct that said Award 
establishes [his] claim of negligent misrepresentation against CMU herein.”  App. 22.    
The District Court‟s reliance on the Arbitration Award to establish conclusively 
Bouriez‟s claim for negligent misrepresentation constitutes a misapplication of the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel.  Pursuant to Pennsylvania law: 
Collateral estoppel is used offensively when the plaintiff seeks to foreclose the 
defendant from litigating an issue the defendant has previously litigated 
unsuccessfully in an action against another party. . . .   
 
[C]ollateral estoppel is valid if 1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication was 
identical with the one presented in the later action, 2) there was a final judgment 
on the merits, 3) the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party in privity 
or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication, 4) the party against whom it is 
asserted has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question in a 
prior action. 
 
Shaffer v. Smith, 673 A.2d 872, 874 (Pa. 1996) (internal quotations and citation 
omitted).
3
  “Collateral estoppel is based on the policy that „a losing litigant deserves no 
re-match after a defeat fairly suffered, in adversarial proceedings, on an issue identical in 
                                              
3
  This is a case of so-called “offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel,” as Bouriez is 
attempting to estop CMU from litigating issues that CMU previously lost in its arbitration 
with third-party Governors.  See generally Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Hyundai Merch. 
Marine Co., 63 F.3d 1227, 1232 (3d Cir. 1995).  The Supreme Court has noted that this 
brand of estoppel may create perverse incentives:  “Since a plaintiff will be able to rely 
on a previous judgment against a defendant but will not be bound by that judgment if the 
defendant wins, the plaintiff has every incentive to adopt a „wait and see‟ attitude, in the 
hope that the first action by another plaintiff will result in a favorable judgment.”  
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979).  This is precisely what appears 
to have happened in this case:  Bouriez successfully opposed arbitrating his dispute with 
CMU, but now seeks to use the findings from that very same arbitration to estop CMU 
from litigating a defense before the District Court.    
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substance to the one he subsequently seeks to raise.‟”  Plaxton v. Lycoming Cnty. Zoning 
Hearing Bd., 986 A.2d 199, 208 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009) (quoting McGill v. Southwark 
Realty Co., 828 A.2d 430, 434 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003)). 
The District Court‟s February 12, 2010 Memorandum Order determined that all 
four elements for collateral estoppel were met in this case.  In regard to the first element – 
that the issue decided in the prior adjudication be identical to the one presented in the 
later action – the District Court simply held “that the essential issues decided in the 
arbitration are identical to the ones presented in this case.”  App. 11.  In two significant 
respects, this conclusion is erroneous in regards to Bouriez‟s negligent misrepresentation 
claim.   
First, any claim for negligence, including a claim for negligent misrepresentation, 
requires the existence of a duty.  See Bouriez II, 585 F.3d at 771 (listing the elements of a 
negligent representation claim and including “a duty recognized by law, requiring the 
actor to conform to a certain standard of conduct for protection of others against 
unreasonable risks” (internal quotations omitted)).  As noted, the Arbitration Award 
determined that CMU owed Governors a duty in light of the two parties‟ “confidential” 
or “special” relationship.  See App. 144-47.  The Arbitration Award did not, however, 
discuss the relationship between CMU and Bouriez, and thus never held that CMU owed 
Bouriez any legally cognizable duty.
4
 
                                              
4
  Indeed, unlike CMU and Bouriez, CMU and Governors had a contractual relationship, 
and the existence of such a contractual relationship is a significant component in 
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 Second, and related, an essential element of any negligent misrepresentation claim 
is that “injury must result to the party acting in justifiable reliance on the 
misrepresentation.”  Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882, 890 (Pa. 1994).  In this case, the 
Arbitration Award relied on the existence of the “special” or “confidential” relationship 
just noted to conclude that Governors “justifiably relied” on CMU‟s misrepresentations.  
App. 147.  Again, the Arbitration Award did not discuss the relationship between CMU 
and Bouriez, and as a result, there is no finding in the Arbitration Award that Bouriez 
justifiably or even actually relied on any representations made by CMU.
5
   
Accordingly, in regard to both of these issues, the District Court erred in relying 
on the Arbitration Award alone to establish Bouriez‟s negligent misrepresentation claim 
against CMU.  Collateral estoppel “forecloses the relitigation of an issue of law or fact 
only when . . . the legal or factual issues are identical.”  Yonkers v. Donora Borough, 702 
A.2d 618, 620 (Pa. Commonw. Ct. 1997) (emphasis added).  For the reasons stated, the 
legal and factual issues resolved by the Arbitration Award are not identical to the legal 
and factual issues presented by this case.  We will therefore vacate and remand with 
                                                                                                                                                  
determining whether a “special” or “confidential” relationship exists under Pennsylvania 
law.  See Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 612 (3d Cir. 
1995) (“Pennsylvania courts analyzing whether there was a duty to speak [resulting from 
a confidential relationship] rely almost exclusively on the nature of the contract between 
the parties and the scope of one party‟s reliance on the other‟s representations.” 
(emphasis added)).   
 
5
  Moreover, although there is some overlap between the alleged representations made by 
CMU to both Governors and Bouriez in 1997, Bouriez‟s claim for negligent 
misrepresentation also relies on different representations made by CMU solely to Bouriez 
in 1999, which were never discussed in the Arbitration Award.   
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instructions for the District Court to determine whether CMU owed Bouriez a legally 
cognizable duty under Pennsylvania law and whether Bouriez actually and justifiably 
relied on CMU‟s misrepresentations.  CMU is entitled to litigate a defense on these issues 
before the District Court in the first instance.   
In remanding this case, we also correct an error in the District Court‟s analysis 
regarding Pennsylvania‟s economic loss doctrine.  The economic loss doctrine, stated in 
its most general form, precludes recovery in tort if the plaintiff suffers a loss that is 
exclusively economic, unaccompanied by an injury to either property or person.  See 
Excavation Techs., Inc. v. Columbia Gas Co. of Pa., 985 A.2d 840, 841 n.3 (Pa. 2009).  
In determining that the economic loss doctrine did not apply in this case, the District 
Court relied primarily on the assumption that because Bouriez was “not bound by 
contract . . . [Bouriez‟s] negligent misrepresentation claim is not precluded by the 
economic loss doctrine.”  App. 26 (citation omitted). 
This is wrong as a matter of Pennsylvania law.  Pennsylvania has not limited the 
applicability of the economic loss doctrine to situations in which the parties are bound by 
a contractual relationship or are otherwise in privity with one another.  Rather, as we 
have noted in two recent cases, Pennsylvania‟s economic loss doctrine may apply even in 
the absence of a contractual duty.  See Azur v. Chase Bank, 601 F.3d 212, 223-24 (3d 
Cir. 2010); Sovereign Bank v. BJ‟s Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 180 (3d Cir. 
2008); see also Am. Stores Props., Inc. v. Spotts, Stevens & McCoy, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 
2d 707, 713 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (collecting cases and noting that “controlling Federal and 
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Pennsylvania state law hold that privity of contract is not required for application of the 
economic loss doctrine to [] negligence claims”).  The District Court thus erred in 
holding that the absence of a contractual remedy, by itself, precluded the applicability of 
the economic loss doctrine.   
Pennsylvania has, however, carved out an exception to the economic loss doctrine 
for claims of negligent misrepresentation asserted pursuant to Section 552 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts.  See Excavation Techs., Inc. v. Columbia Gas Co. of Pa., 
985 A.2d 840 (Pa. 2009); Bilt-Rite Contractors, Inc. v. The Architectural Studio, 866 
A.2d 270 (Pa. 2005).  Section 552 “sets forth the parameters of a duty owed when one 
supplies information to others, for one‟s own pecuniary gain, where one intends or knows 
that the information will be used by others in the course of their own business activities.”  
Azur, 601 F.3d at 223 (internal quotations omitted).  Accordingly, on remand, in the 
course of determining whether CMU owes Bouriez any legally cognizable duty, the 
District Court should determine whether CMU owes Bouriez a duty pursuant to Section 
552, as such a duty would preclude the application of Pennsylvania‟s economic loss 
doctrine.   
B. 
In the April 26, 2010 Revised Order and Judgment, the District Court dismissed 
Bouriez‟s claim for fraudulent misrepresentation “[b]ased on . . . [the] ruling that the 
Arbitration Award has preclusive effect on critical issues in this case . . . [and] the 
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Arbitrator‟s finding that Governors could not sustain its burden of proving fraudulent 
misrepresentation.”  App. 19. 
This holding misconstrues the doctrine of collateral estoppel, which, as noted 
above, only applies when “the party against whom [collateral estoppel] is asserted was a 
party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication.”  Capek v. Devito, 767 A.2d 
1047, 1051 (Pa. 2001).  In this case, CMU was the party to the arbitration with 
Governors.  Accordingly, the District Court erred in relying on the Arbitration Award to 
collaterally estop Bouriez‟s claim for fraudulent misrepresentation.  Cf. Nationwide Mut. 
Fire Ins. Co. v. George V. Hamilton, Inc., 571 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[T]here is 
generally a bar against applying collateral estoppel to those who were not parties in the 
prior litigation.”).6   
CMU concedes this point, but invites this Court to extrapolate from the District 
Court‟s June 22, 2006 one-page order granting CMU‟s motion in limine to exclude any 
claim by Bouriez for punitive damages as somehow also constituting a dismissal of 
Bouriez‟s claim for fraudulent misrepresentation.  See App. 5.  Specifically, CMU posits 
that in the June 22, 2006 order, the District Court ruled “that the intent to deceive 
necessary for a fraud-based award of punitive damages is lacking in this case – and this is 
                                              
6
  Furthermore, Bouriez‟s claim for fraudulent misrepresentation – like his claim for 
negligent misrepresentation – is predicated not only on misrepresentations that CMU 
made to Governors in 1997, but also on misrepresentations that CMU made only to 
Bouriez in 1999.  See supra note 5.   
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the same intent necessary to support any claim for fraudulent misrepresentation.”  CMU 
Br. at 43.   
We disagree.  As an initial matter, the District Court provided no rationale for its 
holding that Bouriez is not entitled to an award of punitive damages, and so it is purely 
hypothetical to assume that the holding was based on the lack of intent.  And, in any 
event, CMU‟s argument fails as a matter of law.  In Pennsylvania, a plaintiff may 
establish the “intent to deceive” adequate to support a claim for fraud but still fail to 
produce the requisite “malice” necessary to support an award of punitive damages.  Cf. 
Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 740-41 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that 
under Pennsylvania law “fraud is not alone a sufficient basis upon which to premise an 
award of punitive damages,” and that “[t]he rule, rather, is that for punitive damages to be 
awarded there must be acts of malice, vindictiveness and a wholly wanton disregard of 
the rights of others.” (quoting Smith v. Renaut, 564 A.2d 188, 193 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1989))).  We will therefore vacate and remand to the District Court to resolve Bouriez‟s 
fraudulent misrepresentation claim in the first instance.
7
 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate and remand for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.    
                                              
7
  Since we vacate the District Court‟s entry of judgment in favor of Bouriez, we will not 
address the various arguments relating to damages on this appeal. 
